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Toward a Unified Theory of Retroactivity
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1969, in Teague v. Lane,1 the Supreme Court completely re-cast its methodology
for determining when to give a new decision retroactive effect. Twenty years later,
the concept of retroactivity and the retrospective2 application of new decisions to old
cases is still not well understood, and often misapplied.3 One reason for this is that
cases involving retroactivity issues are uncommon. While retroactivity concerns
occasionally arise in civil cases, usually having to do with the retroactive effect of
new statutes,4 outside the context of habeas corpus proceedings it is highly unusual
for an issue of the retrospective effect of a new decision to come before the courts.5
The concept of retroactivity is also unusual in that it is almost completely judgemade, involving the practical ramifications of a jurisprudential principle with no
underlying law supporting it. There is no language in the United States Constitution
addressing it,6 no statutory basis for it,7 and no common law of retroactivity beyond
the jurisprudential precept that underlies it. Being judge-made, it is entirely mutable.
As will be seen, the Supreme Court has completely remade it twice in the last fifty
years, casting off the existing practice to replace it, all at once, with a completely new
and comprehensive approach to the problem.
Part II of this article will discuss the jurisprudential principle underlying the
concept of retroactivity and the practical problems created by the application of that
1.

489 U.S. 288 (1989).

2.

This article will use the terms “retroactive” and “retrospective” synonymously. In Danforth v. Minnesota,
552 U.S. 264, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008), the Court pointed out that the use of the term “retroactivity” is
slightly misleading because it suggests that if a case is not retroactive, then it is not backwards-looking
at all, which, as will be discussed, is not accurate. The Court suggested that a better term would be
“redressability,” which is more to the point of the issue of whether, as a practical matter, the courts
should provide relief to a defendant seeking post-conviction relief. However, the Court concluded that
to change terminology would just add more confusion. Id. at 1035 n.5.

3.

Since January 1, 2000, the Supreme Court has issued six decisions in which the application of Teague
was a predominant issue. The last five decisions resulted in reversals on the Teague issue. See Danforth
v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007); Beard
v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004); Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S.
266 (2002). The sixth decision was Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001), in which the Court affirmed the
lower court decision and resolved a split among the circuits.

4.

See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S.
298 (1994).

5.

See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993) (discussing retroactive effect of a recent
Supreme Court decision holding state taxation scheme unconstitutional).

6.

See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965) (“[T]he Constitution neither prohibits nor requires
retrospective effect.”); Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932) (“We
think the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject.”).

7.

The standard of retroactivity expressed in Teague has been incorporated into the federal habeas statutes
to apply to other related issues, like the statute of limitations, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (2006); 28
U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (2006 & West Supp. 2008), the filing of second and successive petitions, see 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (2006 & West Supp. 2008), and the right to a
hearing, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i) (2006), but not to the basic question of whether a new decision
should be applied retrospectively.
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principle. Part III will discuss how the underlying principle and the Court’s solution
to the practical problem in Teague inform a variety of issues in habeas corpus practice.
Part IV will then discuss the unexplored relationship between Teague and the separate
concept of structural error, and suggest that the Court expand the retroactive
application of Teague in certain cases to address this relationship.
II. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL PRINCIPLE OF RETROACTIVITY

A. A Brief History

	The concept of the retroactive operation of court decisions derives from the
fundamental principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence that courts have “jurisdiction
only to declare the law [and] not an authority to make it.”8 The principal is sometimes
called the “declaratory theory of adjudication,” 9 or simply the “Blackstonian view”10
from Lord Blackstone’s statements that judges are “not delegated to pronounce a new
law, but to maintain and expound the old one,”11 and that when courts are called
upon to overturn an existing precedent, they “do not pretend to make a new law, but
to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation.”12 In fact, this principle was
established well before Blackstone. Lord Coke, more than a century earlier, wrote
that “[i]t is the function of a judge not to make, but to declare the law, according to
the golden mete-wand of the law and not by the crooked cord of discretion.”13
	There is no question that the framers of the Constitution understood and accepted
this principle.14 James Wilson, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, and one
of the original Justices of the Supreme Court, wrote that “every prudent and cautious
judge will appreciate . . . his duty and his business is, not to make the law, but to
interpret and apply it.”15 In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton wrote that “[t]he
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.”16
8.

Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

9.

Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 2000).

10.

Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 624.

11.

1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *69.

12.

Id. at *70.

13.

Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901 (quoting 1 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 51 (1642)). A
mete-wand is a “measuring staff of varying lengths,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1012 (8th ed. 2004), in
modern parlance, a yardstick.

14.

See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904). By the late 1780s, Blackstone’s Commentaries had sold
more copies in America than in England, “so that undoubtedly the framers of the Constitution were
familiar with it.” Id. at 69. Indeed, Blackstone is quoted at least once in The Federalist. See The
Federalist No. 84, at 577 (Alexander Hamilton) (Wesleyan Univ. Press 1961).

15.

2 James Wilson, The Works of James Wilson 161 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., Callaghan and Co.
1896).

16.

The Federalist No. 78, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Wesleyan Univ. Press 1961); see also id. at 526
(noting the role of courts is to “declare the sense of the law” and not to substitute “their pleasure to that
of the legislative body.”).
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	The philosophical underpinning of this principle is that “law” exists apart from,
and independent of, the courts whose role it is to interpret it, and is, in effect, waiting
for the courts to identify the correct legal precepts and apply them to the facts at
hand. As a result, judicial determinations are not law in and of themselves, but are
merely “the principal and most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the
existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law.”17
If the law existed prior to the judicial decision identifying it, then a corollary of
that principle is that a court’s declaration of what the law is must necessarily have a
retrospective effect. That is, when a court announces that a particular legal principle
exists, it is a determination that the principle in question has been the law since the
principle was established by the lawgiver, whether that is the Constitution, an act of
the legislature, or the common law. Indeed, Justice Holmes, writing a century ago,
commented that “[j]udicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a
thousand years.” 18 Thus, when the Supreme Court in 2004, in Crawford v.
Washington,19 overruled prior precedent and held that the admission of hearsay
testimonial statements not subject to cross-examination violates the Confrontation
Clause, it was not a determination that the Sixth Amendment had changed in recent
years, but rather that the admission of such statements has always been a violation of
the Confrontation Clause. If there was any doubt that the current Supreme Court
accepts this jurisprudential principle, it was recently put to rest in Danforth v.
Minnesota when the Court explained that “the source of a ‘new rule’ is the Constitution
itself, not any judicial power to create new rules of law. Accordingly, the underlying
right necessarily pre-exists our articulation of the new rule.”20
An example of this principle in practice outside the context of habeas corpus
proceedings is the Supreme Court’s decision in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.21 In
Plaut, the Court analyzed the retroactivity of its recent decision concerning the
statute of limitations in securities fraud actions. When Congress enacted the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it did not create an express private cause of action
for securities fraud; that right was implied by the courts. 22 Without an express
provision establishing a statute of limitations for such actions, the courts borrowed
various state limitations provisions until the Supreme Court ended that practice in
1991 in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, by imposing a one

17.

1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *69.

18.

Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

19.

541 U.S. 36 (2004).

20. 552 U.S. 264, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1035 (2008). For an extended discussion of Danforth, see accompanying

text, infra notes 71–72. See also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1363 (2008) (noting
that the approach to interpreting treaties proposed by the dissenters would be “tantamount to vesting
with the judiciary the power not only to interpret but also to create the law.”).

21.

514 U.S. 211 (1995).

22.

See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 128 S. Ct. 761, 768 (2008).
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year/three year limitations period in all securities fraud actions. 23 Unhappy with this
decision, Congress—instead of establishing a statute of limitations more to its
liking24 —attempted to overrule Lampf. The new legislation reinstated complaints
previously dismissed as untimely if the complaint “would have been timely filed
under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction,
including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed ” the day before Lampf was
decided.25 In considering the constitutionality of that provision, the Supreme Court
in Plaut pointed out that if taken literally, “such laws” on the day before Lampf was
decided would be the same as law on the day after the decision; in fact, the law has
remained the same since the Securities Exchange Act was passed in 1934 because
“[a] judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute
meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”26
Thus, if interpreted literally to mean “the law” as explained in Lampf, the statute
would be “utterly without effect” and would lead to the conclusion that “Congress
enacted, and the President approved, a blank sheet of paper . . . .”27 Accordingly, the
Court interpreted the offending language in the sense intended by Congress—to
mean that courts should return to applying the borrowed limitations periods—which
made the provision unconstitutional on separation-of-powers grounds.28
B. Restraints on Retroactivity

While the jurisprudential principle that all cases are retroactive is generally
accepted as an explanation of the role of the courts in our system of government,
there is also recognition that its unrestrained application could create chaos in the
judicial system. If, for example, the Supreme Court were to determine tomorrow that
an award of punitive damages in excess of a certain amount violates the Due Process
Clause, then the unrestrained application of the principle would allow every civil
defendant who has ever been required to pay punitive damages in excess of that
amount to re-open the litigation to recover the excess payment.29 Similarly, if every
23.

501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991). The action must be filed both within one year of the plaintiff ’s discovery of
the fraud and within three years of the commission of the violation alleged. See id.

24.

This did not occur for another eleven years. See infra note 28.

25.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 476, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1(b)(2)
(2006) (emphasis added).

26. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 216 (1995) (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S.

298, 312–13 (1994)).

27.

Id. at 216.

28. See id. at 240. The provision reinstating dismissed claims violated the separation of powers doctrine

because it compelled the courts to set aside final judgments entered before the enactment of the statute.
See id. As a result, the one-year/three-year limitations period remained in effect until 2002, when
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act establishing a two-year/five-year limitations period. See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 804(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006).

29. For a similar situation, see Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), where the issue was

whether state taxpayers were entitled to a refund by the retrospective application of a recent Supreme
Court decision holding a provision of state tax law unconstitutional.

109

Toward a Unified Theory of Retroactivity

one of the thousands of criminal trials at which evidence was admitted in violation of
Crawford needed to be retried, the criminal justice system would collapse.
Clearly, there needs to be some restraint, either direct or indirect, on the
application of the jurisprudential principle. For the purposes of this article, direct
restraints are those in which the courts create some rule which operates exclusively
on the decision of whether to afford retrospective effect to a new decision. On the
other hand, indirect restraints are those in which other procedural rules serve as
some external limitation on the retroactive application of new decisions.
In the civil context, there are several indirect restraints on the application of the
principle that all decisions have retrospective effect. First among these are statutes of
limitation which cut off the right to bring civil actions after a given period of time.
Thus, if a court had previously held that there was no cause of action for a putative
tort, but has now reversed itself to provide for liability (a decision which would
necessarily have retrospective effect), the generally applicable civil tort statute of
limitations would limit the retroactive application of the decision to alleged violations
that occurred within the statutory limitations period. Similarly, the principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel serve as additional indirect limitations on the
retroactive application of decisions. 30 In criminal cases, the statute of limitations
serves the same effect in some circumstances. That is, a judicial decision that
particular conduct violates a particular statute does not authorize the government to
bring indictments against persons who committed such violations outside the
applicable statute of limitations, even though the decision is an “authoritative
statement of what the statute meant before . . . the decision.”
C. Restraints in Habeas Corpus Cases

	These restraints do not have the same effect in habeas corpus cases. The purpose
of a habeas corpus case is to allow a court to review retrospectively the constitutionality
and accuracy of prior determinations of law, even after those determinations were
subject to review during multiple layers of direct appeal. While federal habeas
petitions are now subject to a one-year statute of limitations, 31 the limitations period
only controls the timing of the filing of the petition and not the issues that can be
raised. Indeed, rather than serving to cut off the retrospective application of new
decisions to old cases, the habeas statute of limitations actually encourages such
review by triggering a new one-year limitations period beginning on “the date on
which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

30. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991) (“[A] decision may be made fully

retroactive . . . consistent with res judicata and procedural barriers such as statutes of limitations. This
practice is overwhelmingly the norm and is in keeping with the traditional function of the courts to
decide cases before them based upon their best current understanding of the law.”) (citation omitted).

31.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006) (state prisoners); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2006 & West Supp. 2008)
(federal prisoners).
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Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”32
	The result is that retroactive application of a new decision in habeas cases is not
restrained in the same manner as it is in other civil and criminal proceedings. As will
be discussed below, the need for a restraint in post-conviction proceedings is
paramount because the lack of such a control can potentially paralyze the criminal
justice system.
	To understand this need, consider the logical arguments of the parties when
confronted with a right newly recognized by the Supreme Court. The petitioner’s
argument, reduced to its most elemental form, is as follows:
1.	I have a strong due process interest in the accurate application of
the law to my case.

2.	At my trial, something happened which would now be regarded
as constitutional error under the new decision by the Supreme
Court.
3.	The new decision is applicable to my case because all cases are
retroactive.
4.	Therefore, I should be granted a new trial at which the court can
accurately apply the law as we now know it to be.
Assuming that the petitioner can actually make out the underlying substantive
claim that a constitutional error occurred, the logical power of this argument is
inescapable and not subject to any attack on its merits. As a result, the state’s response
is not to challenge the argument directly, but rather to attack it based on the practical
ramifications of accepting the argument and the societal cost of applying the
jurisprudential principle whenever it is invoked. Thus, the state’s response is:
1.	At the original trial, the state made a reasonable effort to apply
the law as it was understood at the time.
2.	The state has a strong interest in the finality of its criminal
proceedings for several reasons:
a.	To compel the retrial of every case during which the error in
question occurred would put the state in an untenable position
as witnesses are no longer available, memories have faded,
and evidence has been lost; and
b.	The effect of acquittals or dismissals based on this error
would be to free many dangerous criminals not because they
32.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (2006). The provision for federal prisoners is identical except that it omits
the word “constitutional.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (2006 & West Supp. 2008).
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were in fact innocent, but because the passage of time has
made it impossible to convict them again.33
3.	Therefore, the new constitutional decision should not be applied
retroactively because the societal costs of doing so are too high.
	This argument is just as compelling as the petitioner’s, and creates a situation where
these two powerful interests (graphically displayed below), are juxtaposed against one
another with no obvious way to release the pressure created by this conflict.
State’s interest  Petitioner’s interest in
in finality		
accurate application of law

A safety valve is needed, and that valve has been changed several times over the last
fifty years by the Supreme Court to meet the needs of the time.
Prior to the early 1960s, the Supreme Court routinely applied the jurisprudential
principle of retroactivity in habeas corpus cases, allowing relief to state petitioners
whose convictions were infected with constitutional error.34 This did not present any
serious practical difficulties because there were two important external limitations
on the application of the principle of retroactivity. The first was the standard for
granting federal habeas relief to state prisoners, which required relief only when the
constitutional violation was “so serious that it effectively rendered the conviction void
for lack of jurisdiction.”35 The definition of this standard was somewhat misleading,
however, as it did not involve “jurisdiction” in the sense of a court not having the
legal “authority to hear and determine”36 a case, but rather in the sense that an error
committed in a petitioner’s case was so egregious that by committing the error, a
court forfeited its authority to decide the case.37 The second, even greater, limitation
was that the key provisions of the Bill of Rights had not yet been made applicable to
the states, thereby restricting the types of claims that could be raised in federal
habeas petitions challenging state criminal convictions.

33.

See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).

Id.

[I]ssuance of the habeas writ compels a State that wishes to continue enforcing its laws
against the successful petitioner to relitigate facts buried in the remote past through
presentation of witnesses whose memories of the relevant events often have dimmed.
This very act of trying stale facts may well, ironically, produce a second trial no more
reliable as a matter of getting at the truth than the first.

34. See, e.g., Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); see also Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)

(holding that the knowing use of perjured testimony satisfied this standard, though the Court remanded
so petitioner could exhaust state remedies).

35.

Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1036 (2008).

36. McNitt v. Turner, 83 U.S. 352, 366 (1872).
37.

See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90–91 (1923) (lynch mob’s domination of trial proceedings
effectively deprived court of ability to provide defendants with due process).
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	The retroactivity problem came to the forefront of habeas corpus jurisprudence as
both of these indirect restraints lost effect. The first restraint, the strict standard for
relief, effectively disappeared in 1942 with the Court’s decision in Waley v. Johnston.38
In Waley, the Court abandoned the “lack of jurisdiction” requirement, instead holding
that federal habeas relief is available “where the conviction has been in disregard of
the constitutional rights of the accused . . . .”39 While Waley lowered the standard for
granting relief, it did little to expand the issues which were cognizable in habeas
corpus cases, and there was no imminent need for the Court to address the question
of retroactivity. That all changed in the 1960s when the second restraint was
eliminated by the “serial incorporation of the Amendments in the Bill of Rights,”40
which made a wide variety of claims of the denial of due process rights in state
criminal proceedings cognizable in federal habeas petitions.41
D. The Linkletter Model

With the two restraints on retroactivity eliminated, the application of the
jurisprudential principle requiring the retroactive application of new decisions in all
cases created the potential for disaster. As decision after decision incorporating and
expanding the various protections of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments was handed down by the Supreme Court, it became increasingly likely
that any given state prisoner could point to some federal procedural right—now made
applicable to the states—that was violated during that prisoner’s trial. Thus, an
unbridled application of the general retroactivity principle could truly have resulted
in the states being required to throw open their prison doors.
As a result, in the 1965 case of Linkletter v. Walker, the Court stepped in and, for
the first time, addressed the question of retroactivity for habeas corpus.42 In Linkletter,
which involved the retroactive application of the Court’s earlier decision in Mapp v.
Ohio43 making the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applicable to the states, the
Court took a practical approach to the problem. First, the Court held that it was not
bound to apply cases retroactively because “the Constitution neither prohibits nor
38. 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
39.

Id. at 105; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977) (“[I]n Waley, the Court openly discarded
the concept of jurisdiction . . . as a touchstone of the availability of federal habeas review, and
acknowledged that such review is available for claims of disregard of the constitutional rights of the
accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his rights.”) (citation omitted).

40. Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1036.
41.

See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating right to trial by jury); Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating right to speedy trial); Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14 (1967) (incorporating right to compulsory process); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(incorporating right to confront witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorporating right
against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating right to counsel);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating right against unreasonable search and seizure).

42.

381 U.S. 618 (1965).

43.

367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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requires retrospective effect.”44 Thus, the Court adopted a rule in which it would
consider “the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the
rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will
further or retard its operation.”45 Of critical importance to the Court was the effect
of retroactive application on the administration of justice:
To make the rule of Mapp retrospective would tax the administration of
justice to the utmost. Hearings would have to be held on the excludability of
evidence long since destroyed, misplaced or deteriorated. If it is excluded, the
witnesses available at the time of the original trial will not be available or if
located their memory will be dimmed. To thus legitimate such an extraordinary
procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt would seriously disrupt the
administration of justice.46

	The practical effect of Linkletter was that it allowed the Court to continue to
expand the rights of criminal defendants and at the same time to tailor the retroactive
application of each new rule to avoid placing an undue burden on the states to retry
every previous case in which that new rule had been violated.47 This approach was, at
its heart, a legislative exercise because it left the Court “free to act . . . like a legislature,
making its new constitutional rules wholly or partially retroactive or only prospective
as it deem[ed] wise.”48 The greater problem with Linkletter was that it was almost
completely standard-less. Its case-by-case approach, which focused on the extent to
which the administration of justice would be affected by retroactive application,
inevitably resulted in arbitrary outcomes both between petitioners who were previously
deprived of the right in question, and between the different rights the Court was
incorporating into the Fourteenth Amendment. As between petitioners, the Linkletter
approach was in effect a lottery that allowed the Court to grant relief to the one
petitioner who was fortunate enough to have his or her case selected for review but
not to other prisoners who were denied the same right and whose cases were in
exactly the same procedural posture as the lucky beneficiary of the Court’s decision.49
And, as between the newly-incorporated rights, the Linkletter approach differentiated
among them based on how often the states had been violating the newly-recognized
right prior to the new decision, regardless of the importance of the right, because
44. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932)

(Cardozo, J.) (“We think the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject [of retroactivity].”).

45.

Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.

46. Id. at 637–38.
47.

See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Linkletter “was the
product of the Court’s disquietude with the impacts of its fast-moving pace of constitutional innovation
in the criminal field.”).

48. Id. at 677.
49. As Justice Harlan put it, “[s]imply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a

vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases
subsequently to f low by unaffected by that new rule constitute an indefensible departure from [the
Court’s traditional] model of judicial review.” Id. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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those constitutional protections were the ones that would cause the most disruption
to the system if accorded retroactive application.
As a result, Linkletter led to a wide disparity of results as the Court tailored the
retrospective effect of each new decision to limit the institutional damage that could
be caused by its full retroactive application. Thus, the decision in Griffin v.
California,50 which held that the government may not comment on a defendant’s
decision not to testify, was subsequently made applicable to cases then on direct
review;51 Miranda v. Arizona52 was made applicable only to trials commencing after
that decision;53 and the cases concerning the right to counsel during lineups54 were
made applicable only to lineups conducted after those decisions.55
Linkletter soon met resistance from within the Court. In a series of concurrences
and dissents, Justice Harlan closely examined the issue of retroactivity, and formulated
a model for determining when to apply cases retroactively.56 Twenty-four years after
Linkletter, with the incorporation of the criminal protections in the Bill of Rights
complete and the Court becoming increasingly more conservative, the Court in
Teague v. Lane adopted Justice Harlan’s model, virtually as formulated by him.
	The Teague model basically draws a line at the conclusion of direct appeals
(including a direct appeal to the Supreme Court). In contrast to the pre-Linkletter
system, in which all new decisions were accorded retroactive effect, Teague allows
full retroactive application in cases when direct appeals are ongoing at the time of
the new decision,57 but drastically limits retroactive review after that date. Justice
Harlan and the Teague court described the system as first requiring the determination
whether a decision stated a “new” rule, and if it did, then applying a general rule of
non-retroactivity unless either of two exceptions applied.58 A simpler way to look at
Teague, though, is to view it as creating a strong presumption of non-retroactivity
which can be overcome only in three limited circumstances: (1) if the recent decision
is not “new;” (2) if the new decision establishes a substantive rule “that place[s] . . .
certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal
law-making authority to proscribe,”59 and (3), if the new decision establishes a bedrock
procedural rule that is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”60
50. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
51.

See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 409 n.3, 419 (1966).

52.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

53.

See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721, 733 (1966).

54. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
55.

See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296 (1967).

56. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675–703 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Desist v. United

States, 394 U.S. 244, 256–69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

57.

See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).

58. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305–10 (1989); Desist, 394 U.S. at 260–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59.

Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring).

60. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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	The Teague model does recognize the importance of having the appropriate law
applied to the petitioner’s case,61 but places the greatest emphasis on the need for
finality in criminal proceedings because, in the words of Justice Harlan, retroactive
application would “seriously distort the very limited resources society has allocated to
the criminal process [by] expending substantial quantities of the time and energies of
judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers litigating the validity under present law of
criminal convictions that were perfectly free from error when made final.”62
Furthermore, while this “drain on society’s resources” might be well-spent if it
resulted in more just decisions, such results were not likely because the “very act of
trying stale facts may well, ironically, produce a second trial no more reliable as a
matter of getting at the truth than the first.”63
III. SITUATIONS WHEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION IS PERMISSIBLE

A. Lack of “Newness”

	The rule adopted in Teague is highly responsive to the logical arguments discussed
earlier. Teague only applies the presumption of non-retroactivity when the Court’s
recent pronouncement “really announced a ‘new’ rule” as opposed to “simply
appl[ying] a well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely
analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior case law.”64
The need for this determination flows directly from the first part of the state’s logical
argument discussed above—that the state made a reasonable effort to apply the law
as it was understood at the time. If the rule was not “new”; that is, if it was compelled
by then-existing precedent, then the state’s argument that it had acted reasonably
fails. In Justice Harlan’s language quoted above, this is not a case when the petitioner’s
conviction was “perfectly free from error when made final,” so it is not entitled to the
benefits of a rule allowing the need for finality to trump all other considerations.
B. Retroactivity of Federal Decisions in State Courts

Just as the lack of “newness” implicates the first premise of the state’s argument,
the Court’s 2008 decision in Danforth v. Minnesota65 involves a situation when the
61.

Mackey, 401 U.S. at 689 (Harlan, J., concurring).

Id.

Assuring every state and federal prisoner a forum in which he can continually litigate the
current constitutional validity of the basis for his conviction tends to assure a uniformity
of ultimate treatment among prisoners; provides a method of correcting abuses now, but
not formerly, perceived as severely detrimental to societal interests; and tends to promote
a rough form of justice, albeit belated, in the sense that current constitutional notions, it
may be hoped, ring more “correct” or “just” than those they discarded.

62. Id. at 691.
63. Id.
64. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
65.

552 U.S. 264, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008).
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state’s second premise—its interest in finality—is lacking. The question confronted
by the Court in Danforth was whether state courts are obligated to apply the Teague
standard when considering whether to apply a decision of the United States Supreme
Court retroactively in a state post-conviction proceeding.66 The Court concluded
that the state courts are free to impose a more lenient standard than Teague.67 The
Court reasoned that Teague “was intended to limit the authority of federal courts to
overturn state convictions—not to limit a state court’s authority to grant relief for
violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own State’s
convictions.”68
	Two points concerning this decision are worth noting. First, the decision hints
that a state court could easily evade a contrary rule simply by holding that the state
constitutional right is co-extensive with the federal right at issue, and then applying
the (more lenient) state retroactivity standard to its own decision interpreting its own
state constitution. To take the example used by the Court in Danforth, “[a]ny State
could surely have adopted the rule of evidence defined in Crawford under state law
even if that case had never been decided.”69 Even after Crawford was decided, nothing
would prevent a state from holding that Crawford accurately defines the limits of the
state constitutional provision defining the right to confront witnesses. Having made
such a finding, the state court would be free to apply the retroactivity standard it
applies to its own decisions, whatever it might be,70 and hold that the state
constitutional principle should be applied retroactively.
Second, the decision in Danforth flows directly from the rationale of Teague that
the social cost of enforcing the general jurisprudential principle is too high to impose
on the states. The danger of allowing the retrospective application of decisions is that
such a decision would place the state in the impossible position of either having to
retry hundreds, or even thousands of cases adjudicated years before, or to release any
prisoner who could now establish that a violation of the newly recognized rule
occurred at his or her earlier trial. However, as Justice Stevens put it, “finality of state
convictions is a state interest, not a federal one [so] States should be free to evaluate,
and weigh the importance of [that interest] when prisoners held in state custody are
66. 128 S. Ct. at 1033 (framing the issue as whether “Teague constrains the authority of state courts to give

broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required by [Teague]” (emphasis added)). The
Court did not address the possibility that a state court might decide to impose a narrower standard than
Teague, for example, by eliminating the exceptions, or even deciding not to give retroactive effect to any
cases. See id. at 1034 n.4. The Court’s analysis, focusing on the remedial nature of Teague once a case
reaches the federal courts, suggests that a state court can impose any standard it likes. See id. at 1039.

67.

See id. at 1053.

68. Id. at 1041.
69. Id.
70. For example, both New York and New Jersey apply a rule based on Linkletter that considers the purpose

of the new rule, the degree to which the courts and law enforcement relied on the old rule, and the effect
that making the new rule retroactive would have on the administration of justice. See State v. Feal, 944
A.2d 599, 608 (N.J. 2008); People v. Martello, 93 N.Y.2d 645, 651 (1999).
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seeking a remedy for a violation of federal rights . . . .” 71 In other words, if the state is
willing to accept the potential social costs of retrial or possible release, then there is
no federal interest in preventing it from doing so.72
C. The Reverse-Teague Problem

Another aspect of the Teague retroactivity analysis that has caused some
consternation among courts and commentators is the question of how to apply Teague
to a new decision that limited, or at least did not expand, the rights of criminal
defendants.73 To understand this problem, consider the following hypothetical
situation:
Ten years ago, the Arcadia Supreme Court held in People v. Del Toro that it
was a denial of due process under the United States Constitution for the
prosecutor to wear a red necktie during closing argument based on an

71.

Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1041.

72. Like so many areas of habeas corpus law, Danforth creates an opportunity while at the same time setting

another trap for the unwary petitioner. Assume that the state’s highest court, having accepted the
invitation in Danforth to apply a more lenient standard than Teague, agrees to review retroactively a
defendant’s Crawford claim, but arguably applies Crawford erroneously to deny post-conviction relief. At
that point, the defendant has two options available for further review of his conviction: to apply for
review by the United States Supreme Court of the denial of state post-conviction relief or to file a
federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This creates a problem for the defendant because while
Danforth establishes an avenue for state review of the claim, in a federal habeas petition the Crawford
claim would be lost since the federal district court would be obligated to apply the Teague standard.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has already held that Crawford claims are not entitled to retroactive review
in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
The trap in this situation is that if the defendant chooses the logical first step of seeking review of
the Crawford claim by the Supreme Court (that is, finishing up litigation of the state proceeding before
beginning a new federal proceeding), then under Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007), the time
spent preparing the petition for certiorari and any time while that petition was pending would not toll
the one-year federal statute of limitations for bringing the section 2254 petition. See id. at 332. As a
result, it is highly probable that the time for bringing the federal habeas petition would expire while the
petition for Supreme Court review is pending, effectively denying the petitioner review of any nonCrawford claims. For example, the petitioner in Lawrence had only one day remaining in his limitations
period when the state court denied relief, so his time for filing a section 2254 petition expired even
before he filed his certiorari petition. See id. at 330; see also Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10th
Cir. 1999) (holding that although petitioner had 112 days remaining when the state’s highest court
denied post-conviction relief, the limitations period expired while certiorari petition was pending).

Fortunately, there is a way to avoid this trap. “A petitioner denied relief by a State’s highest court will
now have to file, contemporaneously, a petition for certiorari in [the Supreme] Court and a habeas petition
in federal district court.” See Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 342 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). A petitioner confronted
with the task of simultaneously litigating the Supreme Court case and the habeas petition could then
request a stay of the habeas petition while the separate petition for Supreme Court review moves forward.
See id. at 335 (majority opinion). Indeed, the Court has also endorsed this procedure in the somewhat
analogous situation when the petitioner filed a petition with unexhausted claims and was required to
return to state court to exhaust those claims. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276–78 (2005).

73. See, e.g., 2 Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice & Procedure,

§25.8, at 1245–47 (5th ed. 2005) (contrasting approach taken by courts immediately following Teague
with that taken in Lochart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993)).
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academic study that found that there was a high incidence of wrongful
convictions when the prosecutor did so. This case was not appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, but the issue was finally raised a year ago in
another case, Arcadia v. Matador, in which the Court held that apart from the
trial court’s general authority to control decorum in the courtroom, the Fifth
Amendment imposes no dress code on government attorneys. Smith, the
current petitioner, was convicted at trial before Del Toro and appealed in the
interim between Del Toro and Matador, but his counsel never raised the
neckwear issue on appeal even though there was no question that the
prosecutor was in violation of Del Toro. Smith is now raising the claim in a
habeas petition, arguing that he was denied the right to effective assistance of
counsel since, if the claim had been raised on appeal before Matador, he would
have been granted a new trial by the state appellate court. The state’s response
is that Matador controls, so the claim should be denied, and Smith is arguing
that under Teague, Matador should not be given retroactive effect.74

	This problem is, in fact, a straightforward application of the basic principles of
retroactivity discussed earlier in this article. The first principle of the law of
retroactivity is that all court decisions are retroactive back to the source of the law
underlying that decision. As a result, in the above hypothetical, after the decision in
Matador, it is now clear that the holding in Del Toro was never “the law” in the
jurisprudential sense that the term is used here; Matador has now conclusively
established that there was no dress code implicit in the Due Process Clause for as
long as there has been a Due Process Clause.75 In effect, then, petitioner Smith is
asking the federal habeas court to apply a decision that was erroneous when it was
decided, and has since been thoroughly repudiated. This puts him in a far different
position than the petitioner in a conventional Teague situation who is asking the
habeas court to apply a decision which is now known to state the correct principle of
law that, in a more perfect world, would have been applied to his case in the first
place. When looked at from this perspective, any argument by Smith that the failure
to apply the earlier, now repudiated decision is unfair to him lacks any force at all.76
In effect, Teague is “a one-way street.”77

74.

This hypothetical is not as far off the mark as it might seem. In Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006),
the Court vacated a Ninth Circuit decision which had granted habeas relief on the grounds that it was a
violation of the accused’s due process rights for family members of a murder victim to wear a lapel
button with a photograph of the victim at the trial of the accused. The Court held that since there was
no clearly established federal law on this issue, habeas relief was precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See
Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77.

75. See Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1035 (“[T]he source of a ‘new rule’ is the Constitution itself, not any judicial

power to create new rules of law.”).

76. See Desai v. Booker, 538 F.3d 424, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The goal of the great writ is not to correct the

misapplication of overruled precedents.”).

77.

Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, C.J.) (“The Supreme Court deems Teague a
one-way street: . . . it entitles the state, but not the petitioner, to object to the application of a new rule
to an old case.”).

119

Toward a Unified Theory of Retroactivity

Indeed, the Supreme Court came to exactly that conclusion in Lockhart v.
Fretwell, although the Court addressed the issue rather cryptically.78 Fretwell involved
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel’s failure to object to
a jury charge allowing the jury to consider an aggravating factor in the sentencing
phase of a capital trial79 which had, at that time, been held unconstitutional by the
federal court of appeals, but which was later upheld as valid by the Supreme Court.80
After addressing the ineffective assistance of counsel issue at length, the Court
addressed the Teague issue in the last two paragraphs of the decision (reprinted in the
footnote below), holding that petitioners gain no benefit from Teague with respect to
new decisions that do not expand the rights of criminal defendants.81
	The ineffective assistance argument raised in the hypothetical is unavailing as
well. One of the elements for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland v. Washington is that the defendant must establish prejudice, which is
defined as an error “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.”82 In the reverse-Teague situation, a petitioner will never be able to
demonstrate prejudice under that standard because the only harm that the petitioner
suffered as a result of counsel’s failure to raise the issue on direct review is that he or
she was denied the opportunity to have a court make the same mistake again. 83
Thus, in our hypothetical, if counsel had raised the Del Toro defense, Smith may
have received some (undeserved) relief at the state level, but the prosecution would
78. 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
79. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 367.
80. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
81.

See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372–73.

[Teague] was motivated by a respect for the States’ strong interest in the finality of
criminal convictions, and the recognition that a State should not be penalized for
relying on the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original proceedings
took place. The new rule principle therefore validates reasonable good-faith
interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts, even though they are shown
to be contrary to later decisions.

A federal habeas petitioner has no interest in the finality of the state-court
judgment under which he is incarcerated: Indeed, the very purpose of his habeas
petition is to overturn that judgment. Nor does such a petitioner ordinarily have any
claim of reliance on past judicial precedent as a basis for his actions that corresponds to
the State’s interest . . . . The result of these differences is that the State will benefit from
our Teague decision in some federal habeas cases, while the habeas petitioner will not.
This result is not, as the dissent would have it, a “windfall” for the State, but instead is
a perfectly logical limitation of Teague to the circumstances which gave rise to it.

Id. (citations omitted).

82. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
83. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 371 (The only prejudice from defense counsel’s error in not raising the now-

discredited claim was that it “deprived respondent of the chance to have the state court make an error in
his favor.”) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 10); see also Evans v. Hudson, 575 F.3d
560, 566 (6th Cir. 2009) (Petitioner “cannot show the necessary prejudice for his claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel based on the failure to raise a now-meritless claim . . . .”).

120

VOLUME 54 | 2009/10

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

inevitably have appealed that decision (as it did in Matador). The Supreme Court
would then have identified the correct legal principle (except that Smith, and not
Matador, would have his name on the key decision), and Smith would be in exactly
the same position as he is now.
Another way to look at the situation, which leads to the same conclusion, is by
reference to the concept of Teague as a valve releasing the pressure between the
conf licting interests of the state and the petitioner. As discussed, Teague is a
mechanism that serves to relieve the tension between the state’s interest in the finality
of its judgments and the petitioner’s interest in the application of the correct legal
principles to his case:
State’s interest   Petitioner’s interest in
in finality		
accurate application of law

At first glance, the reverse-Teague situation appears to be the converse of this
situation. Indeed, that is the position taken by Justice Stevens in his dissent in
Fretwell:
If, under Teague, a defendant may not take advantage of subsequent changes
in the law when they are favorable to him, then there is no self-evident reason
why a State should be able to take advantage of subsequent changes in the law
when they are adverse to his interests.84

But when we test this hypothesis, it fails. If this were truly the converse situation,
it would be graphically illustrated as:
State’s interest   Petitioner’s interest
in accurate		
in finality
application of law

	The left side of this diagram is certainly true, that is, that the government in a
reverse-Teague situation now has a powerful interest in the accurate application of the
law. But, as the Fretwell court pointed out, “[a] federal habeas petitioner has no
interest in the finality of the state-court judgment under which he is incarcerated:
Indeed, the very purpose of his habeas petition is to overturn that judgment.”85 Thus,
the true graphic representation of the reverse-Teague situation is:
State’s interest in 
accurate application
of law
State’s interest in 
finality

As there is no conflict between the two interests at stake, there is no need for a
release from the tension between them, and no need for the mechanism provided by
Teague. Justice Rehnquist fittingly concluded his opinion in Fretwell by quoting the
84. 506 U.S. at 388 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 373 (majority opinion).
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Latin maxim “Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex”86 (when the reason for the law
ceases, the law itself ceases).
A variation on Fretwell, but with a key difference that relates directly to the
principles discussed here, is presented by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Young v.
Dretke.87 At the time of the offense in Young, Texas had an unusual speedy-trial
provision under which a defendant arrested for a particular offense had a right to be
indicted prior to the end of the next term of court. Failure to indict the defendant, in
the absence of a showing of good cause, required that the charges be dismissed.88
Another section of the code then provided that such a dismissal “is a bar to any
further prosecution for the offense discharged and for any other offense arising out of
the same transaction.”89 Thus, Texas law provided, in effect, that the only remedy for
an unexcused pre-indictment delay was dismissal of the charges with prejudice.90
Young was arrested for murder in September 1991, which gave him the right to
be indicted by early July 1992, but the indictment was not filed until February 1993.91
Counsel never filed a motion to dismiss under the speedy trial provisions, although
this likely would have led to a dismissal with prejudice.92 Young was subsequently
convicted and sentenced to sixty years in prison.93 In the interim between Young’s
direct appeal and his state habeas petition, the Texas statutes were amended to
eliminate the bar to prosecution for late-filed indictments, effectively allowing
re-indictment if permitted under the applicable statute of limitations.94
On its face this seems like a reverse-Teague situation: Under current law, Young
would have no claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he
could be re-indicted. The critical difference, however, between the situation in Young
and that in the hypothetical situation is that in the latter, “the law” remained the
same throughout—the legal principle expressed in Del Toro was always wrong and
the principle expressed in Matador was always correct—while in Young’s situation,
the prior statute was the controlling legal principle until it was amended by the Texas
86. Id.
87.

356 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2004).

88. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann art. 32.01 (Vernon 2006).
89. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann art. 28.061 (Vernon 2006).
90. In contrast to the Texas provisions, the federal Speedy Trial Act requires that the indictment be filed

within thirty days of arrest, and the failure to do so requires dismissal of the charges. See 18 U.S.C. §§
3161(b), 3162(a)(1) (2006). The trial court, however, has discretion to dismiss with or without prejudice.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1). In New York, absent a showing of good cause, a defendant must be released
from detention if not indicted within forty-five days of arrest, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.80(b)
(McKinney 2007), but there is no speedy trial provision requiring dismissal of the charges based on preindictment delay. Instead, this is treated as a due process issue applying a variation of the federal
constitutional standard. See People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 444–45 (1975).

91.

See Young, 356 F.3d at 620.

92.

See id.

93.

See id. at 620.

94. See id. at 621–22.
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legislature. Therefore, Young was absolutely entitled to the application of the prior
statute and the failure of counsel to raise what seems like a slam-dunk defense
constituted ineffective assistance. This was precisely the conclusion reached by the
Fifth Circuit in granting habeas relief.95
Surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit’s grant of relief did not end Young’s case. The
state obtained a new indictment on the murder charge, which Young sought to
dismiss on the basis that the dismissal under the prior statute had to be with prejudice.
The trial court agreed and dismissed the new indictment, but the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the provision requiring dismissal with
prejudice was unconstitutional under the Texas Constitution’s explicit separation of
powers provision.96 In so holding, the court noted that its decision that the prior
statute was unconstitutional brought Fretwell back into play because that decision
would be entitled to retroactive application (that is, the statute was unconstitutional
from the time of its passage), so Young had no right to rely on it.97

95. See id. at 627–28.

Fretwell dealt with a right declared by a judicial decision, a right which had achieved no
recognition as a final statement of the law. Restated, the rule relied on by Fretwell was
proclaimed by a single judicial decision and was not finally settled as a binding legal
principle. The case, and the rule it announced, had, in fact, been overruled by the time
Fretwell raised the issue in habeas. In short, Fretwell had no legal “entitlement” to a
rule that had never “vested” as a final statement of the law. Implicit in this concept is
that finality of a federal constitutional rule is never established until the Supreme Court
has spoken.

Statutes, as “final” statements of the law, are distinguishable. Once a statute is
duly enacted by the legislature, it is a “final”, if not necessarily permanent, statement of
the law on that particular point. Although it may be attacked in collateral proceedings
as unconstitutional, it has achieved recognition as a final statement of the law by the
lawgiver, that is, the legislature and, indeed, the state, and the statute confers benefits
that the law recognizes and protects. . . . Unlike the benefit sought in Fretwell, a state
statute is not an error, misapprehension, or “right the law simply does not recognize.”
Thus Young was, at the time of his arrest, indictment and trial, legally entitled to the
final “vested” rights conferred upon him by the duly enacted Texas statutes; Fretwell,
on the other hand, was not lawfully entitled to claim the benefit of a judicial rule that
had not become finally authoritative.

Id. (quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 186 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).

96. See Ex parte Young, 213 S.W.3d 327, 331–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). For an explanation of the

separation of powers issue, see State v. Condran, 977 S.W.2d 144, 144–47 (Tex. Cr. App. 1998) (Keller,
J., dissenting). The basis of the argument is that the requirement that the indictment be dismissed with
prejudice “seriously disrupts a prosecutor’s ability to perform his duties,” Ex parte Young, 213 S.W.3d at
331, without incorporating the constitutional standard for reviewing pre-indictment delays. Condran,
977 S.W.2d at 146 (Keller, J., dissenting).

97.

See Ex parte Young, 213 S.W.3d at 332 n.4 (“Under Fretwell, appellant did not suffer legitimate Strickland
prejudice because, like the subsequently overruled Eighth Circuit decision in Fretwell, the now
unconstitutional version of Article 28.061 applicable to appellant’s case no longer entitles him to a
dismissal with prejudice of his murder prosecution.”).
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D. The First Teague Exception

	The second ground for applying a new decision retroactively (in Teague parlance,
the first exception) is for substantive rules “that place, as a matter of constitutional
interpretation, certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power
of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”98 Like the Danforth and Fretwell
situations, the first exception reflects an instance when the government’s second
premise—its strong interest in finality—lacks force. As Justice Harlan stated, finality
has no place “in permitting the criminal process to rest at a point where it ought
properly never to repose.”99 Furthermore, this situation “entails none of the adverse
collateral consequences of retrial”100 because a decision holding that, as a matter of
constitutional law, the conduct in question could not have been punished criminally
in the first place means that there can be no further proceedings.
At first glance, the first exception appears to be of narrow breadth, but, as it
turns out, it has been invoked on several occasions, and recent events have brought it
to the forefront of habeas corpus jurisprudence. The Supreme Court, however, has
addressed the substance of the first Teague exception in only one decision, Penry v.
Lynaugh.101 This decision is unusual as Supreme Court decisions go, because it is
entirely theoretical. The issue before the Court in Penry was (a) whether the execution
of the mentally retarded is unconstitutional, and (b) if so, then whether that decision
is entitled to retroactive application. The Court turned that question on its head,
answering (b) first, even though a negative answer to (a) would have obviated any
need to address (b) at all. This was necessary because if the holding of issue (a) could
not be applied retroactively, then Penry would not be entitled to any relief, and
therefore would have lacked standing to bring the challenge.102
	The Court stated that the first exception is generally intended to apply to “new
rules according constitutional protection to an actor’s primary conduct . . . .”103 This
would include new rules “placing certain conduct beyond the State’s power to punish
at all,” but the Court expanded that protection here to include new rules “placing a
certain class of individuals beyond the State’s power to punish by death . . . .”104 Thus,
the Court concluded that “Teague should be understood to cover not only rules
forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules prohibiting
a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or
offense.”105
98. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 693.
100. Id.
101. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
102. See id. at 329.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 330 (emphasis added to both quotations).
105. Id.
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The Court was thus free to discuss the substantive issue of whether the Constitution
prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded, but held that it did not.106 That
substantive holding was reversed thirteen years later in Atkins v. Virginia,107 but
because it was a direct appeal the Court had no reason to revisit the Teague issue in
Atkins. Lower courts, both state and federal, have unanimously concluded that the
Teague discussion in Penry remains in force and that Atkins is entitled to retroactive
application.108
Subsequently, in a situation quite similar to Penry and Atkins, the Supreme Court
reversed prior precedent and held in Roper v. Simmons that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of defendants who committed the underlying offense before
reaching the age of eighteen.109 Because Roper involved an appeal from the denial of
state post-conviction relief, the Court did not discuss the retroactivity problem.
However, the situation is indistinguishable from Atkins, as all of the lower courts to
address the issue have held.110
	Thus, prior to 2008, all of the discussion of the first Teague exception involved
new rules limiting the application of the death penalty to certain classes of
defendants.111 That is all likely to change in the near future, however. In District of
106. See id. at 330–35, 340.
107. 536 U.S. 304, 317–21 (2002).
108. See Allen v. Buss, 558 F.3d 657, 661 (7th Cir. 2009); Davis v. Norris, 423 F.3d 868, 879 (8th Cir. 2005);

In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 2003); Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir.
2002); Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 681–82 (6th Cir. 2002); Duncan v. State, 925 So. 2d 245, 250–
51 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Clemons v. State, CR-01-1355, 2003 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 217
(Ala. Crim App. Aug. 29, 2003)); Engram v. State, 200 S.W.3d 367, 369 (Ark. 2004); Head v. Hill, 587
S.E.2d 613, 621 (Ga. 2003); Pizzuto v. State, 202 P.3d 642, 650 n.4 (Idaho 2008); Williams v. State,
793 N.E.2d 1019, 1027 (Ind. 2003); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 370 (Ky. 2005); State
v. Dunn, 831 So. 2d 862, 882 n.21 (La. 2002); Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d 95, 145–48 (Miss. 2003) (by
implication); Johnson v. State, 102 S.W.3d 535, 539 n.12 (Mo. 2003); State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011,
1015 (Ohio 2002); Pickens v. State, 74 P.3d 601, 603 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003); Franklin v. Maynard,
588 S.E.2d 604, 606 n.6 (S.C. 2003).

109. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005), overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).

Note that Penry and Stanford were decided the same day.

110. See Holly v. State, No. 3:98CV53-D-A, 2006 WL 763133, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 24, 2006); Little v.

Dretke, 407 F. Supp. 2d 819, 823–24 (W.D. Tex. 2005); Johnson v. Dretke, No. 4:00-CV-1709-Y, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4763, at *8–14 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2005); Duncan v. State, 925 So. 2d 245, 250–52
(Ala. Crim. App. 2005); see also Sims v. Commonwealth, 233 S.W.3d 731, 733 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007)
(“[A]lthough Roper must be given retroactive application in all those cases in which a sentence of death
was imposed upon a defendant who was under the age of 18 at the time he committed the crime, this is
not such a case.”).

111. The Court’s recent decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), which held that the death

penalty may not be imposed in cases of child rape, would also fall within the same category as Atkins
and Roper. It appears, however, that there are not any defendants who will need the retroactive
application of Kennedy, as the direct appeal of the only other defendant sentenced to death under these
circumstances was still pending at the time Kennedy was decided. See id. at 2657.

Another recent decision also raises retroactivity issues, but does not involve Teague. In Begay v.
United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008), the Court held that state felony convictions for driving under the
influence are not predicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)
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Columbia v. Heller, decided in June 2008, the Court held for the first time that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms, and invalidated
a provision of the D.C. Code that effectively precluded the possession of firearms in
one’s home.112 Although no court decisions discussing the retroactivity of Heller
under Teague have appeared as yet,113 Heller is certain to be invoked by many convicted
defendants seeking collateral relief, and it seems beyond argument that Heller is
exactly the kind of case that would come within the first exception to Teague. Heller
undoubtedly places certain primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of
(1) (2006). This decision would not qualify under the first Teague exception because it does not put any
conduct beyond the authority of the government to punish as a constitutional matter, but rather is a
determination that a federal criminal statute, as currently in effect, does not apply to the conduct in
question. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620–21 (1998). The retroactivity of such decisions
is governed, not by Teague, but by Bousley and Davis v. United States. 417 U.S. 333 (1974). Davis held
that Supreme Court decisions determining that the defendant was found guilty “for an act that the law
does not make criminal” should be applied retroactively. Id. at 346. In the first decision to address the
retroactivity of Begay, the government conceded that Begay is entitled to retroactive application. See
United States v. Glover, No. 08-CV-0261-CVE-FHM, 2008 WL 2951085, at *4 (N.D. Okla. July 28,
2008). Subsequent district courts have divided on the issue with some holding that Davis applies to
allow retroactive application, see, e.g., United States v. Radabaugh, No. 08-CV-762-CVE-TLW, 2009
WL 565065 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 5, 2009), while others apply Teague, incorrectly it would seem, and reject
retroactive application. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 04-269 (MJD/AJB), 2009 WL 2611279
(D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2009); see also United States v. Cobb, No. 3:04-171-CMC, 2008 WL 3166118
(D.S.C. Aug. 4, 2008) (holding defendant had sufficient number of other predicates to bring him within
ACCA, without addressing retroactivity of Begay).
In early 2009, the Court held that the failure to report to jail for weekend confinement does not
count as a predicate under the ACCA. See Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009). Chambers
raises identical retroactivity issues to Begay, and as with that decision, a split in the district courts has
arisen. Compare United States v. Blue, Civ. No. 09-1108, 2009 WL 2581284 (D. Kan. Aug. 20, 2009)
(holding Davis applies, so Chambers is retroactive) with United States v. Narvaez, No. 09-cv-222-bbc,
2009 WL 1351811 (W.D. Wis. May 12, 2009) (holding Teague applies so Chambers is not retroactive).
112. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799, 2821–22 (2008).
113. The first district court cases involving post-conviction motions raising Heller claims all involved

arguments that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006), which prohibits the possession of weapons by convicted
felons and other individuals, is unconstitutional. In Heller, the Court specifically stated that “nothing in
our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill,” 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17, so the district courts have denied the motions on the
basis of that statement without discussing the retroactivity of Heller under Teague. See United States v.
Lippman, No. 4:02-cr-082, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88685, at *8 (D.N.D. Oct. 20, 2008) (person
subject to domestic restraining order under section 922(g)(8)); Reynolds v. Sherrod, No. 08-cv-506JPG, 2008 WL 3287042 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2008) (felon-in-possession under section 922(g)(1)); Johnson
v. United States, No. 1:07CV155 HEA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51148 (E.D. Mo. July 2, 2008) (felonin-possession under Section 922(g)(1)); see also Hamblen v. United States, No. 3:08-1034, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 98682 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2008) (holding Heller does not invalidate 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)
concerning possession of machineguns). It should be noted that courts are under an obligation to
consider the retroactivity issue first whenever the government raises it. See Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266,
271–72 (2002) (“[A] federal court considering a habeas petition must conduct a threshold Teague analysis
when the issue is properly raised by the state.”); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994) (“[I]f the
State does argue that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule of constitutional law, the court must
apply Teague before considering the merits of the claim.”). Therefore, it appears that the government
may not have raised the issue in the cases involving post-conviction motions raising Heller claims.
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the government to proscribe, although the parameters of that right are not yet clear.
Thus, in the next few years we can expect numerous collateral challenges by state
and federal prisoners raising Heller claims, although the interplay between Heller and
the procedural habeas corpus rules is exceedingly complex.114
E. The Second Teague Exception

	The third circumstance in which the presumption of non-retroactivity is overcome
(known widely as Teague’s second exception) relates to errors of the highest magnitude
that involve “those procedures that . . . are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.’”115 In Teague, Justice O’Connor, describing the exception as “reserved for
watershed rules of criminal procedure,” joined two concepts separately identified by
Justice Harlan in Mackey and Desist.116 First, the exception will apply only to those
cases that implicate the fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings; that is, those
decisions which “‘will properly alter [an] understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.’”117
114. For defendants who have not previously filed a habeas petition under sections 2254 or 2255, a new one-

year statute of limitations provision is triggered on “the date on which the constitutional right asserted
was initially recognized by the Supreme Court . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (2006); 28 U.S.C. §
2255(f)(3) (2006 & West Supp. 2008) (omitting the word “constitutional”). As the constitutional
right—the individual right to possess firearms under the Second Amendment—was “initially
recognized” on the date Heller was issued, June 26, 2008, prisoners seeking to challenge weapons
convictions under Heller retroactively had until June 26, 2009 to file section 2254 or 2255 petitions. See
Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005). The tolling provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), would
extend that time for state prisoners who begin state post-conviction proceedings in order to exhaust
remedies, but this is further complicated by the Court’s decision in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408
(2005), which held that a state petition dismissed as untimely is not “properly filed” under section
2244(d)(2), so it does not toll the federal limitations period. Id. at 410. Thus, if there is any question
about the timing or procedural propriety of the state filing, the petitioner should file a federal petition
immediately, and request a stay of the habeas petition under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), while
the state proceeding moves forward.

For petitioners who have filed a previous petition, the situation is even more complicated. A
successive petition may not be filed under section 2244(b)(2)(A) or 2255(h)(2) until the Supreme Court
itself holds the new decision is entitled to retroactive application under Teague. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S.
656, 662 (2001). As this did not occur in Heller, which was a direct appeal in a civil case, successive
petitions are not yet ripe, even though the one-year statute of limitations is already running and will, in
all likelihood, expire before the Supreme Court ever has the opportunity to address the retroactive
application of Heller. Thus, for federal prisoners this appears to be an instance when the remedy provided
by section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” under section 2255(e), justifying resort to the habeas
corpus remedy in section 2241. For state prisoners, section 2254 does not include the same “inadequate
or ineffective” language, but the interaction between section 2244(b)(2)(A) and the statute of limitations
is arguably an unconstitutional suspension of the writ, again justifying resort to section 2241. The oneyear limitations period does not apply to section 2241, see Morales v. Bezy, 499 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir.
2007); White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2004), but it would obviously be the best
course to file the section 2241 petition as soon as possible in order to avoid any suggestion of laches.
115. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,

302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).

116. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
117. Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693–94 (Harlan, J., concurring)) (emphasis added by O’Connor, J.).
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Second, the exception will only apply to decisions which “‘significantly improve the
pre-existing factfinding procedures,’”118 that is, “those procedures without which the
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”119
In the aftermath of Teague, the Court has never wavered from Justice O’Connor’s
formulation of the second exception, and has repeatedly emphasized that the
exception is limited to that “small core of rules”120 which constitute “‘watershed rules
of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the
criminal proceeding.”121 Even if a decision enhances the accuracy of criminal
proceedings, “[m]ore is required” for the decision to be retroactive.122 Thus, the Court
held that a decision meant to improve the accuracy of capital-sentencing proceedings
was not entitled to retroactive application because “given that it was added to an
existing guarantee of due process protection against fundamental unfairness, we
cannot say this systemic rule enhancing reliability is an ‘absolute prerequisite to
fundamental fairness’ of the type that may come within Teague’s second exception.”123
Furthermore, rights afforded to defendants in “a limited class” of cases cannot be
said to have altered the understanding of the bedrock procedural elements when
compared to “the sweeping rule of Gideon, which established an affirmative right to
counsel in all felony cases . . . .”124
	The “small core of cases” that fit within the second exception is exceedingly
small. Indeed, while the Court has repeatedly identified Gideon v. Wainwright, which
held that all defendants charged with a felony have the right to counsel,125 as coming
within the exception, it has not recognized any post-Teague case as meeting the
standard.126 The lower courts have recognized several cases as coming within the
exception, although most of these have been reversed or overruled by the Supreme
118. Id. at 312 (quoting Desist, 394 U.S. at 262 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
119. Id. at 313.
120. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993).
121. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
122. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990).
123. Id. at 244 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 314).
124. O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997).
125. 372 U.S. 335, 339–45 (1963). In Gideon, the State of Florida did not provide counsel to the petitioner

even though he could not afford an attorney. Gideon therefore represented himself at trial and was
convicted of burglary. The Supreme Court subsequently granted his pro se application for review. The
Court remanded for a retrial, holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, and that indigent defendants charged with a felony were entitled
to be provided with counsel at trial. See id. at 337–38, 340, 345. At a retrial conducted with appointed
defense counsel, Gideon was acquitted. See Anthony Lewis, Gideon’s Trumpet 237, 249 (Vintage
Books 1989) (1964).

126. One recent possibility is United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), where the Court held

that the denial of the right to counsel of choice is structural error. However, the first appellate court to
consider the retroactive effect of Gonzalez-Lopez held that it did not fall within the second exception
because it was predicated on the defendant’s interest in autonomy and not on any interest in accuracy.
See Rodriguez v. Chandler, 492 F.3d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 2007).
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Court.127 As will be discussed below, the few remaining cases are all subject to serious
question.128
IV. TEAGUE AND STRUCTURAL ERROR

A. Structural Error

A species of error often discussed by the Court that involves a standard similar in
tone and language to Teague’s second exception is structural error. In Chapman v.
California, the Court held that constitutional errors do not necessarily require reversal
of a criminal conviction and that most errors can be reviewed for harmless error.129
In so holding, the Court divided constitutional errors into two broad categories: trial
errors and structural errors. Trial errors are those errors that occur during the
presentation of the case to the jury and that can be “quantitatively assessed in the
context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”130 Structural errors are those errors that involve
the denial of “constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can
never be treated as harmless error.”131 The Court has subsequently described structural
127. See, e.g., Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Whorton v. Bockting, 549

U.S. 406 (2007). Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2000), and Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448 (4th
Cir. 1992), both recognized Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), as coming within the second
exception. However, the Supreme Court in Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004), later held that Mills
did not fall within the second exception. Similarly, West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 2000),
recognized Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), as a case that applied retroactively. The Supreme
Court later held in Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001), that Cage does not apply retroactively.

128. See discussion of Graham v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1991), infra Part IV.B., and discussion of Hall

v. Kelso, 892 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1991), infra note 196.

The only other federal decision invoking the second exception which has not been reversed or
overruled, and which does not involve a non-structural error, is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ostrosky
v. Alaska, 913 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1990). In Ostrosky, the defendant twice violated a state fishing
regulation, was convicted and appealed, but an intermediate court held the regulation unconstitutional.
See id. at 592. While the state’s appeal of that ruling was pending, the defendant committed a third
violation and was charged again. See id. As an affirmative defense to the third charge, defendant argued
that he was entitled to rely on the then-under-appeal order holding the statute unconstitutional even
though the regulation had since been upheld on appeal after the third violation was committed. See id.
The state court rejected that argument but a federal district court granted habeas corpus relief. See id. at
593. The Ninth Circuit held that a due process rule allowing a defendant to rely on “a lower court
decision in his own case that a statute is unconstitutional even though the case is on appeal to a higher
court” would constitute a new rule, but that it would fall within the second exception, although the
court denied relief on substantive grounds. Id. at 594. With all respect, this is not a case involving the
second exception at all. The sought-for rule would allow a defendant to avoid criminal prosecution for
certain acts because of the legal status of the underlying regulation at the time of the offense. Thus, this
is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure; indeed, it is not a rule of criminal procedure at all, but
rather a substantive rule that would have the effect of putting “private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 290 (1989)
(internal citation omitted), and would arguably fall within the first Teague exception.
129. 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
130. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307–08 (1991).
131. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23.
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errors as those that “undermine[ ] the structural integrity of the criminal tribunal
itself,”132 and that “necessarily render[ ] a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an
unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.”133 Thus, while trial errors are
subject to harmless error review under one of two standards depending on when the
error is identified,134 structural errors are “necessarily unquantifiable and
indeterminate” and require reversal.135
	The list of structural errors is also short. The Court has itself identified only
seven such errors:136 bias by the trial judge; total deprivation of the right to counsel;
denial of the right to self-representation at trial; denial of the right to a public trial;
discrimination in the selection of grand jurors; giving a defective jury instruction
defining reasonable doubt; and denial of the right to counsel of choice.137
132. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1986).
133. Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218–19 (2006) (citation omitted).
134. In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1999), the Court held that in cases on direct review, the harmless

error standard is that described in Chapman, which is that reversal of the conviction is required unless
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. However, in habeas
corpus cases, the standard is that described in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), which is
that the error is harmless unless it had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict.” Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776; see Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (“The Kotteakos standard, we
believe, fills the bill.”).

135. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.

275, 282 (1993)).

136. The Court has listed the errors on several occasions. See, e.g., Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 218 n.2; Neder v.

United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999). On the same day Recuenco was decided, the Court added denial of
the right to counsel of choice to the list in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), but did
not include it in the list of structural errors included in Recuenco.

In Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006), the Court held that the trial court’s failure to
make on-the-record findings to support an ends-of-justice continuance as required by the Speedy Trial
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (2006), was not subject to the harmless error rule. See 547 U.S. at 508–
09. The Court’s discussion, however, characterized this as an interpretation of statutory language in the
Act as “an implied repeal” of the harmless error rule in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), rather
than as a structural error. See 547 U.S. at 507.

If Zedner were to be characterized as structural error, it would be the first time the Court
recognized a non-constitutional error as structural, an issue that has divided the lower courts. Compare
United States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273, 280 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding violation of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 23 not subject to harmless error rule because “whether violative of the Constitution
or not, the error is structural”) and McGriff v. Department of Corrections, 338 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th
Cir. 2003) (holding denial of statutory right to counsel in post-conviction hearing was “structural error”)
and Green v. United States, 262 F.3d 715, 717–18 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding denial of statutory right to
counsel not subject to harmless error rule) with United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 734
(10th Cir. 2005) (“[G]enerally speaking structural errors must, at a minimum, be constitutional errors.”)
and United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2000) (A “nonconstitutional error . . . generally
cannot amount to a structural defect.”).
137. See Johnson v. United States, 420 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997). In Johnson, the Court characterized these

previously identified deprivations as structural errors. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993)
(defective jury instruction defining reasonable doubt); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)
(discrimination in selection of grand jurors); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (right to public
trial); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (right of self-representation at trial); Gideon v.
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	The Court has imposed limitations that serve the purpose of keeping the list
short, stating that “if the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial
adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred
are subject to [the] harmless–error [rule].”138 The lower courts, however, have
recognized other structural defects that implicate the right to counsel139 or involve
the seating of a biased juror.140 Courts have also found the “strong presumption”
overcome in several instances when the trial court engaged in some egregious
departure from normal trial protocol.141 In addition, the lower courts are divided on
the question of whether the failure to include a necessary element of the offense in an
indictment is a structural error.142
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, (1963) (deprivation of right to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)
(bias by trial judge). In Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court recognized the right to counsel of choice and held
the deprivation of it to be structural error. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 144–50.
138. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986).
139. See, e.g., McGriff v. Dep’t of Corrections, 338 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding district court’s

failure to appoint counsel ahead of hearing on section 2254 petition was structural error); Green v.
United States, 262 F.3d 715, 717–19 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding district court’s failure to appoint counsel
ahead of hearing on section 2255 motion was not subject to harmless error rule).

140. See, e.g., United States v. Carpa, 271 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2001); Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d

453, 463 (6th Cir. 2001); Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Johnson v.
Armontrout, 961 F.2d 748, 756 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Virgil v. Dretke, 446 F.3d 598, 607 (5th Cir.
2006) (referring to juror bias as structural error in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
But see Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding juror bias subject to harmless
error review).

141. See, e.g., United States v. Yakobowicz, 427 F.3d 144, 153–54 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding structural error

where trial court allowed prosecutor to make interim summation after testimony of each government
witness); United States v. Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d 913, 922 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding structural error
where trial court prevented defendant from introducing evidence relevant to theory of defense); United
States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273, 280 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding structural error where trial court completed
trial with eleven jurors in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b)); United States v.
Harbin, 250 F.3d 532, 542–49 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding structural error where trial court allowed
prosecution to exercise mid-trial peremptory challenge); United States v. Mortimer, 161 F.3d 240, 241–
42 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding structural error where trial judge was absent from courtroom during defense’s
closing argument).

142. Compare United States v. Du Bo, 186 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999) (a deficient indictment is not

“amenable to harmless error review.”) and United States v. Spinner, 180 F.3d 514, 515–16 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding deficient indictment not subject to harmless error review) with United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d
940, 945 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he defect in [the] indictment was not structural error.”) and United States
v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 28 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he absence of an indictment on the aggravating
factors used to justify a death sentence is not structural error and is susceptible to harmless error review.”)
and United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 306 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he failure of an indictment to allege
an element of a charged offense, may be reviewed for harmlessness . . . .”) and United States v. Cor-Bon
Custom Bullet Co., 287 F.3d 576, 580–81 (6th Cir. 2002) (“As [defendant] failed to meet its burden of
proving prejudice, and has not even alleged prejudice, any defect in the indictment was harmless error.”)
and United States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 981 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[T]he failure of an
indictment to allege an essential element of a crime . . . is subject to harmless error review.”) and United
States v. Corporan-Cuevas, 244 F.3d 199, 202 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[A]ny error resulting from [an
indictment] omission was harmless”). See also United States v. Omer, 429 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Graber, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that Du Bo rule “makes no sense” and “drains judicial resources”).
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B. The Relationship Between Teague and Structural Error

Although the standards governing structural error and Teague’s second exception
are quite similar (both implicate the fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings
and the accuracy of the fact-finding process), no court has attempted to analyze that
relationship in any systematic way beyond suggesting that there may be some defined
relationship between the two.143 The remainder of this Article will attempt to do this.
As shown in the series of Venn diagrams in the following discussion, there are
five potential relationships between the set of cases that constitute structural error
and the set of cases that qualify for retroactive application under the second exception
to Teague. They are:
1.	No overlap; that is, no cases qualify as both structural error and
under the second exception (see figure 1, below).

2.	Complete overlap; that is, all structural errors qualify under the
second exception, and vice versa (see figure 2, below).
3.	Structural error is a subset of the second exception; that is, all
structural errors are part of the larger group of cases which
qualify under the second exception (see figure 3, below).
4.	Partial overlap; that is, some but not all structural errors qualify
under the second exception, and vice versa (see figure 4, below).
The Supreme Court has sent mixed signals on this issue, stating almost fifty years ago that this
error is “far too serious to be treated as nothing more than a mere variance and then dismissed as
harmless error.” Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960). The Court, however, never included
it in its list of structural errors. See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218 n.2 (2006). In 2007, the
Court accepted a case for argument to address this issue, but held instead that the omitted element need
not have been included in the indictment for the particular offense at issue. See United States v.
Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 106–11 (2007).

Recent decisions of the Court suggest that this error might be viewed as harmless. For example,
the Court has held that the failure to instruct a jury on an essential element of an offense can be harmless
when the evidence supporting that element was such that no reasonable jury could have found it not to
have been proven. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999). On the other hand, one member of
the Court has made it clear that he views this defect in an indictment as a structural error. See ResendizPonce, 549 U.S. at 117 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. See Coleman v. United States, 329 F.3d 77, 90 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]t would be anomalous to say, on the

one hand, that Apprendi errors are not ‘structural’ . . . and then to say, on the other hand, that Apprendi
announced a ‘watershed’ rule of criminal procedure.”); United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d
664, 670 (9th Cir. 2002) (“This implies that Teague’s second exception is even narrower than the
category of structural-error rules.”); United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[F]
inding something to be a structural error would seem to be a necessary predicate for a new rule to apply
retroactively under Teague.”) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 150–51 (4th Cir. 2001));
People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118, 1124 (Colo. App. 2004) (“[I]t is difficult to conceive of a rule that
could be considered a watershed principle when a violation of the rule is susceptible to plain or harmless
error review.”), aff ’d, 129 P.3d 977 (Colo. 2006). The Colorado Supreme Court left open the possibility
that a case may exist where a classification of harmless error coincides with watershed status. See
Edwards, 129 P.3d at 988.
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5.	The second exception is a subset of structural error; that is, all
cases which qualify under the second exception are part of the
larger group of cases which qualify as structural error (see figure
5, below).
Determining which of these is correct has been simplified to some extent by the
Supreme Court, which has eliminated the first three of the five possibilities. The
first possibility, that there is no overlap between the two sets of cases, is illustrated as
follows:

Figure 1. No overlap between structural error (S) and second exception (T).

	This possibility can be eliminated if there is any case that would qualify as both
being a structural error and falling under the second exception. The Court has made
clear on numerous occasions that there is at least one such case: Gideon v.
Wainwright.144 It is indisputable that the constitutional error recognized in Gideon—
the complete denial of counsel—is a structural error; indeed, it is conspicuously first
when the Court lists such errors.145 At the same time, the Court has repeatedly
identified Gideon as the kind of error which would qualify under the second
exception,146 calling it the “paradigmatic example of a watershed rule,”147 and the
Court has recently stated that Gideon is “the only case that we have identified as
qualifying under this exception . . . .”148
	The second and third possible relationships, when there is complete overlap and
when structural error is a subset of cases coming within the larger set of cases which
qualify under the second exception, are illustrated as follows:

144. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
145. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148–49 (2006); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S.

461, 468–69 (1997).

146. See, e.g., O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997) (“[W]e have cited [Gideon] as an example of the

sort of rule falling within Teague’s second exception.”); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (“[W]
e have usually cited Gideon . . . to illustrate the type of rule coming within the [second] exception.”).

147. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996) (citing Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495).
148. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007); see also Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004) (“In

providing guidance as to what might fall within this exception, we have repeatedly referred to the rule
of Gideon and only to this rule.”) (citation omitted).
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Figure 2. Complete overlap between structural error (S) and second exception (T).

Figure 3. Structural error (S) is a subset of the second exception (T).

	These both can be eliminated if there is any structural error that does not qualify
under the second exception. Although the Court has never specifically identified a
case that would meet those criteria, it has discussed the issue in terms that clearly
indicate that there are such cases and lower courts have interpreted the Court’s
discussion in this way.
Tyler v. Cain149 involved a successive habeas petition150 that attempted to raise a
claim for which the trial court had given the same reasonable doubt instruction found
unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana.151 This was an error the Court had subsequently
identified as a structural error in Sullivan v. Louisiana.152 In holding that Sullivan did
not establish that Cage was entitled to retroactive application so as to permit petitioner
149. 533 U.S. 656 (2001).
150. A successive petition is one filed after a previous petition has been dismissed. The right to file such

petitions is extremely limited, both substantively, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2006) (grounds for filing
successive petition); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1)–(2) (2006 & West Supp. 2008) (same), and procedurally.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (permission of court of appeals required before filing); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)
(same).

151. 498 U.S. 39, 40 (1990).
152. See 508 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1993). Cage, Sullivan, and Tyler all involved a Louisiana jury instruction that

described reasonable doubt using the terms “grave uncertainty,” “actual substantial doubt,” and language
to the effect that “[w]hat is required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty.”
Cage, 498 U.S. at 40 (emphasis deleted); see also Tyler, 533 U.S. at 659 (“[T]he jury instruction defining
reasonable doubt . . . was substantively identical to the instruction condemned in Cage . . . .”); Sullivan,
508 U.S. at 277 (“[T]he trial judge gave a definition of ‘reasonable doubt’ that was . . . essentially
identical to the one held unconstitutional in Cage . . . .”). This instruction was held unconstitutional
because these terms together suggest a “higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the
reasonable doubt standard.” Cage, 508 U.S. at 41.
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to file a successive petition,153 the Court in Tyler responded to the argument that by
holding the Cage error to be structural, Sullivan necessarily found it to fall within the
second exception:
There is no . . . case that held that all structural-error rules apply retroactively
or that all structural-error rules fit within the second Teague exception. The
standard for determining whether an error is structural is not coextensive
with the second Teague exception, and a holding that a particular error is
structural does not logically dictate the conclusion that the second Teague
exception has been met.154

In a footnote, the Court continued:

Classifying an error as structural does not necessarily alter our understanding
of these bedrock procedural elements. Nor can it be said that all new rules
relating to due process (or even the “fundamental requirements of due
process”) alter such understanding. On the contrary, the second Teague
exception is reserved only for truly “watershed” rules.155

	The Court concluded this footnote with one final indication of whether Cage is
retroactive, reciting a comment first made in Teague and repeated many times since:
“As we have recognized, it is unlikely that any of these watershed rules ‘ha[s] yet to
emerge.’”156
	The Court did, however, stop just short of deciding whether Cage is entitled to
retroactive application. The specific question before the Court was whether it had
previously held Cage to fall within the second exception, a necessary precondition to
filing a successive petition. Therefore a finding that Cage qualified for retroactive
application “would not help Tyler in this case.”157
Despite the repeated admonition that it was unlikely that any watershed rules
had yet to emerge,158 prior to Tyler, six federal circuit courts of appeals had unanimously
153. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 664–66. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2006), one of the grounds for bringing

a successive habeas petition is when “the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive
to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” A parallel provision
creates the same grounds for bringing successive section 2255 motions by federal prisoners. See 28
U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (2006 & West Supp. 2008).

154. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 666–67 (citation omitted).
155. Id. at 666 n.7 (citations omitted).
156. Id. (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 243 (1990)) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313

(1989)); see also Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 416 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 312–13). The
Court has repeated this statement every time it has discussed Teague since Tyler. See Whorton v.
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 417 (2007); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004); Schriro v. Summerlin,
542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004).

157. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 668. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2006), a successive petition is permitted with

respect to a claim “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court . . . .” Thus, for
Tyler’s claim to fall within this provision, the Court must have previously held that Cage had been made
applicable retroactively. As the Court had not done so in Cage or Sullivan, a finding now that Cage was
entitled to retroactive application would still not qualify under this provision.

158. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.

135

Toward a Unified Theory of Retroactivity

concluded that Cage should be applied retroactively.159 The only court to consider the
issue after Tyler160 was the Ninth Circuit in Leavitt v. Arave.161 In Leavitt, the court
rejected the earlier cases, stating that “[i]n light of Tyler, pre-Tyler circuit authority
[holding Cage retroactive] is no longer persuasive.”162 Considering the question
afresh,163 and in light of Tyler, the Ninth Circuit held that Cage did not fall within
the “‘small core of rules’ . . . that can truly be categorized as ‘groundbreaking.’”164 The
court noted the oft-repeated caution of the Supreme Court that it is unlikely that any
159. See Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116, 1121–23 (10th Cir. 2000); West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53, 61–63 (3d

Cir. 2000); Gaines v. Kelley, 202 F.3d 598, 604–05 (2d Cir. 2000); Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F.3d 552,
553 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175, 178–79 (4th Cir. 1994); Nutter v. White, 39
F.3d 1154, 1157–58 (11th Cir. 1994).

160. It is not likely that this issue will arise again, as the operation of the statute of limitations in habeas cases

tends to give issues like this a very short shelf life. In Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (2005), the
Supreme Court held that the one-year statute of limitations for petitions raising claims involving newlyrecognized rights under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) begins to run from the
date of the Supreme Court decision recognizing the new right, and not from the date that the
retroactivity of that decision is recognized. See Dodd, 545 U.S. at 357. To make matters worse for
petitioners, under Tyler, a successive petition raising a claim involving a newly-recognized right may not
be raised until the Supreme Court itself finds the decision entitled to be applied retroactively. See Tyler,
533 U.S. at 662. As the Supreme Court rarely holds that a decision is retroactive within one year of that
decision, in many cases the statute of limitations will expire before the right to file the claim accrues. See
Dodd, 545 U.S. at 361 n.1, 364 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 372 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also
Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868, 871–72 (7th Cir. 2005) (successive petitions must be timely under
Dodd “even if time runs out before a given avenue of attack . . . becomes legally and factually tenable.”).
While these time periods may be extended for state prisoners by the provision which tolls the statute of
limitations while the petitioner is attempting to exhaust the claim in the state courts, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(2) (2006), it is still highly likely that the effect of this is to create a right without a remedy.
Thus, this situation is a good candidate for resort to a true habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. See supra note 114.
In fact, the only time the Court has recognized the retroactivity of a decision under Teague was
within one year of that decision, and it did so before the decision recognizing the existence of the new
right. In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the Court held that if the execution of the mentally
retarded was unconstitutional, then it would fall within the first Teague exception, see id. at 330, but
then held that the right did not exist. See id. at 340. Thirteen years later, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002), the Court reversed Penry, holding that the execution of the mentally retarded violates the
Eighth Amendment. See id. at 321. Thus, the decision in Atkins satisfied Tyler, as the Court had already
held the right to be retroactive in Penry, and triggered a new one-year limitations period under Dodd.
See In re Hill, 437 F.3d 1080, 1083 (11th Cir. 2006) (successive petition raising Atkins claim was untimely
since it was filed more than one year after Atkins).

161. 383 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2004).
162. Id. at 825.
163. The court’s statement that this was an issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit was slightly

disingenuous. In Harmon v. Marshall, 69 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1995), the court held that Sullivan fell
within the second exception. While the Leavitt court’s statement that it had “never decided whether to
apply Cage retroactively on habeas review,” 383 F.3d at 824, is technically true, it is difficult to separate
Cage and Sullivan since the question addressed by the Supreme Court in Sullivan was whether the
reasonable doubt instruction given in Cage was structural error.

164. Leavitt, 383 F.3d at 825 (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510

U.S. 383, 396 (1994)).
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cases falling within the second exception have yet to emerge, concluding that “[i]t
follows that it is ‘unlikely’ that Cage is a watershed rule.”165 As the Supreme Court
has repeated this same caution after Tyler,166 it is difficult to argue with this conclusion,
and so the two possibilities in figures 2 and 3 would appear to be eliminated.
	The fourth possible relationship between structural error and the second
exception is that there is partial overlap between them:

Figure 4. Partial overlap between structural error (S) and the second exception (T).

For this possibility to be correct, there have to be cases that fall into all three
subsets in the diagram: from left to right (1) structural errors that are not watershed
rules; (2) errors that are both structural and watershed rules; and (3) watershed rules
that are not structural errors. The first two appear to exist: (1) Cage was held to be a
structural error in Sullivan, and Tyler v. Cain all but held that Cage errors are not
watershed rules;167 and (2) Gideon has been held to be both structural error and a
watershed rule. The question, then, is whether there can be decisions that are entitled
to retroactive application under the second exception, but are not structural errors.
Clearly, the Supreme Court has never found such a case, as it has never identified any
case except Gideon to be entitled to retroactive application under the second exception.
An examination of the few cases that have been held by lower courts to satisfy the second
exception reveals only one Supreme Court decision in which courts have held the decision
entitled to retroactive application and then gone on to conduct harmless error review:
cases involving the Supreme Court’s decision in Cruz v. New York.168
Almost twenty years before Cruz, in Bruton v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that the admission of the confession of a non-testifying codefendant against
another defendant at a joint trial violates the Confrontation Clause.169 Soon after
that decision, a number of lower courts recognized an exception to Bruton for
“interlocking confessions,” holding that a codefendant’s confession is admissible
165. 383 F.3d at 826 (quoting Tyler, 553 U.S. at 667 n.7).
166. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
167. The Seventh Circuit recently placed United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 163 (2006), in this

category as well, holding that it is not entitled to retroactive effect after the Supreme Court held that the
denial of the right to counsel of choice is structural error. See Rodriguez v. Chandler, 492 F.3d 863, 866
(7th Cir. 2007).

168. 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
169. 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
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against a defendant who also gave a confession that is corroborated by the
codefendant’s; that is, when the two confessions “interlock.”170 In Parker v. Randolph,
the Supreme Court addressed this issue, but could not reach a majority on any
question presented.171 Finally, in Cruz, the Court returned to the issue, rejected the
exception, and concluded that Bruton applies to interlocking confessions,172 although
the Court did hold that this error was subject to the harmless error rule.173
In Graham v. Hoke,174 the Second Circuit confronted the question of whether Cruz
is entitled to retroactive application under Teague. The first question the court
considered was whether Cruz was in fact a “new” rule. On one hand, the Cruz court
stated that it was a straightforward application of Bruton, which suggests that it is not
“new” under Teague.175 On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Parker v. Randolph
had been unable to reach a majority decision on the same question later decided in
Cruz, and the lower courts had divided roughly evenly on the issue in the interim
between Bruton and Cruz.176 Finding it difficult to analyze whether Cruz was new or
not, the Graham court elected to turn to the question of whether the decision would be
entitled to retroactive application under the second exception even if it were new.177
	The Graham court concluded that Cruz fell within the second exception.178 In the
court’s view, Cruz was a decision that satisfied the test for the second exception because
it was primarily concerned with the accuracy of the criminal trial.179 It further stated
that Cruz passed the test because “there can be little doubt that the decision altered our
understanding of a bedrock procedural principle aimed at ensuring a fair proceeding.”180
170. See, e.g., People v. McNeil, 24 N.Y.2d 550, 552 (1969).
171. 442 U.S. 62 (1979). Four justices found that the exception for interlocking confessions existed. See id. at

74–75 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). Justice Blackmun disagreed with that conclusion, but found
that the error was subject to the harmless error rule, and that the error was harmless. See id. at 77–81
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Three Justices also rejected the
exception, but did not reach the question of whether the harmless error rule should apply because they
found that the lower courts’ conclusion that the error was harmless precluded a finding to the contrary.
See id. at 81–82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

172. See Cruz, 481 U.S. at 191–93.
173. See id. at 193–94.
174. 946 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1991).
175. Id. at 991–93.
176. Id. at 993. See Cruz, 482 U.S. at 196–97 (White, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
177. See Cruz 946 F.2d at 993. The court noted that if Cruz was not a new rule, then it would be entitled to

retroactive application, and if it was a new rule that fell within the second exception, it would also be
entitled to retroactive application, thereby eliminating the need to determine whether it stated a new
rule or not. Id.

178. See id. at 993. In People v. Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d 265, 275–76, 1995), the New York Court of Appeals

agreed that Cruz should be given retroactive effect. In addition, the Illinois Appellate Court applied
Cruz retroactively in People v. Kubik, 573 N.E.2d 1337, 1343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).

179. See Graham, 946 F.2d at 993.
180. Id. at 993–94.
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It also recognized that in Roberts v. Russell,181 the Supreme Court had previously held
that Bruton should be applied retroactively.182 Having concluded that it could apply
Cruz to Graham’s case, the Second Circuit then considered whether the error at
Graham’s trial was harmless, and held that it was.183
	Looking at Graham from today’s perspective, it is clear that its retroactivity
determination was incorrect.184 An examination of the f laws in the decision is
instructive for the purposes of analyzing the relationship between structural error
and the second exception.
First, while the court did attempt to apply the standards created in Teague,
it appeared to misunderstand them in a fundamental way. The second exception
is limited to watershed rules of criminal procedure which alter our understanding
of the bedrock procedural elements of criminal procedure. The Graham court
discussed this element by stating that Cruz altered our understanding of a bedrock
procedural element—the Confrontation Clause—but that misses the point of the
exception which is limited to the “small core” of cases like Gideon that created a
“sweeping rule . . . which established an affirmative right . . . in all felony cases . . . .”185
The Second Circuit’s invocation of the exception is far too broad, as nearly every
constitutional criminal procedure case that reaches the Supreme Court is likely to
alter our understanding of some bedrock procedural element in one way or another.
What the Court was aiming at, it seems clear, was to encompass rules that
fundamentally alter our understanding of the criminal process in the broadest sense,
for example, the right to counsel or to a trial by an unbiased factfinder. Cruz involves
a right afforded to “defendants in a limited class of . . . cases”186 that falls far short of
a watershed rule.187
181. 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
182. See Graham, 946 F.2d at 994.
183. See id. at 994–97.
184. Several state courts, including the New York Court of Appeals, also found Cruz to fit within the second

exception. See supra note 178. The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S.
264, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1034–41 (2008), however, creates an interesting opportunity for New York counsel
in future cases concerning the retroactive application of United States Supreme Court decisions in the
state courts. At least two potential arguments are available: first, that the Court of Appeals should
continue to apply Teague to address the retroactivity of federal decisions even though the Court of
Appeals may have erroneously applied that standard in Eastman; and second, that to the extent the
Court of Appeals believed that it was required to apply the Teague standard to rights protected by the
federal constitution, Danforth freed it from that obligation allowing the court to apply its own more
lenient standard based on Linkletter.

185. O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997).
186. Id.
187. Graham’s analysis of Cruz as enhancing the accuracy of a conviction is also suspect. As the Supreme

Court has stated, by precluding the admission of potentially accurate inculpatory evidence on
Confrontation Clause grounds, “the overall effect of Crawford with regard to the accuracy of fact finding
in criminal cases is not easy to assess.” Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007). The same is
obviously true of Cruz, which precludes the introduction of a co-conspirator’s statement confirming the
defendant’s own statement that the defendant participated in the offense.
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Second, even before Graham, the Supreme Court pointed out in Sawyer v. Smith
that a rule “added to an existing guarantee of due process protection against
fundamental unfairness [is not] ‘an absolute prerequisite to fundamental fairness’ of
the type that may come within Teague’s second exception.”188 Cruz error is a subspecies
of Bruton error—the issue in Cruz, after all, was whether interlocking confessions
were an exception to the Bruton rule. And, as it turns out, Bruton errors are a
subspecies of Crawford error, as the confession of a codefendant is simply one example
of the out-of-court testimonial statements that the Crawford court found to violate
the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court held in Whorton v. Bockting189 that
Crawford does not fall within the Teague exception,190 raising the question of how the
overarching procedural rule (Crawford) could not be a watershed rule while a
subspecies of a subspecies of that rule (Cruz) could be.191 Indeed, the Second Circuit
had an opportunity to answer that question prior to Whorton in Mungo v. Duncan,
where it held, without citation to Graham, that Crawford should not be applied
retroactively.192
	Third, and most critical for the discussion here, the Graham court never discussed
the relationship between its finding that Cruz is entitled to retroactive application
and its discussion of the harmless error rule. Although the Supreme Court never
considered whether Cruz error is “structural,” its endorsement of harmless error
review of Cruz errors was an implicit holding that it was not a structural error, as
structural error is defined as an error that can never be harmless. Thus, the Graham
court placed Cruz into the third category of Figure 4, but without a discussion of
what this means. By holding that Cruz was entitled to retroactive application, the
Graham court necessarily found that the right recognized in Cruz was “essential to
the accuracy and fairness of the criminal process,”193 and, at the same time found that
it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.194 While the Supreme Court has
since held that the proper standard for assessing harmless error is less exacting in
habeas cases (that an error is harmless unless it had a “substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury’s verdict”),195 the unavoidable conclusion is that
188. 497 U.S. 227, 244 (1990) (citation omitted).
189. 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
190. See id. at 421.
191. Unfortunately, the Whorton Court did not discuss how its holding that Crawford was not entitled to

retroactive application affected its earlier decision in Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), where the
Court held that Bruton should be applied retroactively. The obvious answer to that question is that
Roberts was decided under the Linkletter standard repudiated in Teague. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 28 n.4, Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007) (No.
05-595), (Roberts was “based on retroactivity principles that Teague condemned [and is] therefore
inapposite here.”).

192. 393 F.3d 327, 336 (2d Cir. 2004).
193. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 243 (1990).
194. Graham, 946 F.2d at 997.
195. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627 (1999) (citation omitted).

140

VOLUME 54 | 2009/10

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

these standards are mutually exclusive. A right cannot be both “essential to . . .
accuracy and fairness” and trivial enough that it can be overlooked as harmless; that
is, insubstantial and lacking injurious effect or influence on the verdict. That indeed
is the crucial distinction between Gideon and Cruz. A proceeding in which the
defendant was deprived of the right to counsel in violation of Gideon can never be fair
even if all the evidence in the world establishes that defendant committed the offense.
That is why Gideon both fits within the second exception and involves a structural
error. On the other hand, a case involving a non-structural error like Cruz, which
can be deemed harmless depending on the other evidence admitted, can never be
essential to the accuracy and fairness of the proceeding for the simple reason that it
has already been determined that it can sometimes be overlooked; that is, it is not an
essential protection.196 And if that is true, then there can be no cases that can fit in
the third segment of Figure 4, and it too must be eliminated.
By default, then, we are left with the situation depicted in Figure 5, in which the
second exception is a smaller subset of structural errors:

Figure 5. The second exception (T) is a subset of structural error (S).

Indeed, as noted previously, a number of courts have reached this conclusion
intuitively.197 There are several implications which follow from this conclusion. The
first involves the issue in Teague analysis known as primacy. The Supreme Court has
made it clear on several occasions that a court must address the question of whether
a decision is entitled to retroactive application as a threshold matter before it can
address the question of whether the defendant would be entitled to relief under the
decision in question.198 While the recognition that all cases within the second
exception must also involve structural errors does not alter the need for this threshold
196. Another case that falls within the same category as Graham is Hall v. Kelso, 892 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir.

1990), which held that a violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), falls within the second
Teague exception. See Hall, 892 F.2d at 1543 n.1. But see Johnson v. McKune, 288 F.3d 1187, 1200 (10th
Cir. 2002) (holding Sandstrom not within second Teague exception); Cain v. Redman, 947 F.2d 817, 822
(6th Cir. 1991) (holding Sandstrom not within second Teague exception).

Hall suffers from the same problem as Graham. The Supreme Court has specifically held that
Sandstrom error is subject to the harmless error rule. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 583–84 (1986).
Thus, even though the Hall court found the error not to be harmless, the fact that it is non-structural
should be enough to disqualify it from consideration under the second exception. See Hall, 892 F.3d at
1546–47 (“[W]e find that the . . . constitutional error was harmful.”).
197. See supra note 143.
198. See, e.g., Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 271–72 (2002); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994).
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analysis, it suggests that the question of structural error should be integrated into the
threshold Teague analysis. After all, if a case is determined not to fall within the
larger set of structural errors (the larger circle in Figure 5), then it can never fall
within the subset (the smaller circle) that is the second exception. This will make
decisionmaking somewhat simpler, as the structural/non-structural determination
seems to be easier for courts to apply.
Second, there is an absurd result lurking in this situation. Assume that a federal
district court, in considering a habeas petition, erroneously applies existing precedent
to hold that the petitioner did not establish a particular claim of a constitutional
violation. The court of appeals then reverses that denial of relief, holding that there
was an error under existing caselaw, but that it is subject to the harmless error rule
and remands for a determination whether the error was harmless. While that remand
is pending, the Supreme Court resolves a split in the circuits and holds that the error
in question is structural, but that it is not a watershed rule entitled to retroactive
application (that is, that it fits within the larger circle but not within the smaller
circle in Figure 5). At this point, what is a district court to do? It cannot apply the
new Supreme Court decision retroactively because it is not a watershed rule. At the
same time, it cannot apply its original holding, which was incorrect even under thenexisting precedent. This leaves it in the impossible position of having to do as it was
instructed by the court of appeals: to conduct harmless error review even though the
Supreme Court has just held that the error in question is not amenable to such
analysis as a matter of constitutional law.
While this situation seems far-fetched, a variation on it actually arose in a recent
Seventh Circuit case, although the court of appeals attempted to craft its opinion to
avoid stating that it was placing the district court in this untenable position. In
Rodriguez v. Chandler,199 an earlier Seventh Circuit decision, the court held that relief
for the erroneous denial of the right to counsel of choice is warranted upon a finding
that the error had an adverse effect on the defense.200 While the case was on remand
in the district court for that determination, the Supreme Court decided United States
v. Gonzalez-Lopez, holding that the erroneous denial of the right to counsel of choice
is structural error.201 The district court in the Rodriguez case then granted habeas
relief on the basis of Gonzalez-Lopez, and the case returned to the Seventh Circuit.202
The Seventh Circuit then held that Gonzalez-Lopez did not fall within the second
Teague exception and that the district court should have applied pre-Gonzalez-Lopez
law (the earlier decision by the court of appeals) and made the determination whether
the error had an adverse effect.203 Thus, although the Seventh Circuit attempted to

199. 492 F.3d 863 (7th Cir. 2007).
200. See Rodriguez v. Chandler, 382 F.3d 670, 673–76 (7th Cir. 2004).
201. 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).
202. See Rodriguez v. Chandler, 492 F.3d 863, 864 (7th Cir. 2007).
203. See id. at 866.
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distinguish between this adverseness requirement and harmless error, 204 the court
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether there is a role for
harmless error analysis after the Supreme Court had already held that the error is not
susceptible to this analysis at all.
	This anomaly suggests that the Supreme Court needs to take another look at the
second exception. By all appearances the Court has created an “exception” that is
exceedingly small and that may never find another qualifying case. At the same
time, Rodriguez reveals a logical flaw in the structural error/watershed rule analysis.
The Court clearly has the authority to broaden or narrow the rules of retroactivity at
will—it did so in adopting Linkletter, and again in jettisoning it in favor of Teague,
and then broadened the first Teague exception in Penry by expanding its coverage
from cases placing substantive conduct beyond “the State’s power to punish at all ” to
include cases placing that conduct “beyond the State’s power to punish by death.”205
	The simple remedy for this problem is to expand the second exception to make it
co-extensive with structural error as represented in Figure 2.206 Structural errors
consist of a small group of cases all involving either the right to counsel, bias by the
fact-finder, or some egregious departure from trial norms by the trial judge, so
expanding the exception will not result in large numbers of cases being retried. Those
cases that do get retried will all involve errors that “necessarily render[ed] a criminal
trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or
innocence,”207 so the cases affected are truly those whose final judgments should not
be entitled to respect in any event. They are all cases in which a petitioner’s interest
in the accurate application of a constitutional principle outweighs a state’s interest in
the finality of its badly flawed judgment, undermining the basic logic of Teague.
V. Conclusion

After twenty years of practice, it appears that the Teague model for addressing
retroactivity problems in federal habeas corpus is here to stay, at least for the
foreseeable future. The Supreme Court has shown no hint of wavering from the
approach developed by Justice Harlan and adopted in Teague. At the same time,
Congress has indicated its acceptance and support of the model by incorporating the
Teague standard into the habeas corpus statutes in a number of ways.
	The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the declaratory theory of
adjudication, a principle of jurisprudence recognized since the mid-seventeenth
century, creates the need for a set of rules addressing the retroactive application of
204. See id.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 103–04.
206. It is also possible, at the theoretical level, that Congress could codify the Teague standard, somehow

broadening the exception to make it coextensive with structural error. This is unlikely, however, as
Congress has shown no inclination to broaden the number of convicted prisoners who are released on
collateral review.

207. Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218–19 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999)).
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new decisions by courts in general, and particularly by courts considering postconviction petitions by criminal defendants. Indeed, habeas corpus presents a special
problem with regard to retroactivity issues because the unrestrained application of
the declaratory theory would lead to chaos, requiring state governments, at regular
intervals, to throw open the prison gates. Accordingly, the Teague model was designed
to strike some balance between the competing interests of the states and their
criminal defendants inherent in the practical application of the declaratory theory.
The model creates what is, at heart, a presumption of non-retroactivity which may be
overcome in a few discrete situations directly responsive to the conflict between the
state’s interest in the finality of its decisions and the defendant’s interest in the
accurate application of the law.
One aspect of Teague that has not been explored by the courts is the relationship
between structural errors—those errors not subject to the harmless error rule as a
matter of constitutional law—and the Teague exception for watershed rules of
criminal procedure. While the language defining structural error and the exception
is quite similar, courts have tended to treat them as separate questions. In fact, there
is a defined logical relationship between these concepts: the cases which fit within
the exception are a subset of the cases which qualify as structural errors. Recognition
of this relationship by the courts will improve their decisionmaking, as classification
of an error as non-structural necessarily excludes that error from consideration under
the second exception.
Finally, the article concludes with the suggestion that given the narrow scope of
these two concepts—only a few cases qualify as structural errors and even fewer
(actually none since Teague was decided) fall within the second exception—the Court
should expand the exception to make it coextensive with structural error. Every
structural error involves a serious departure from constitutional procedural
requirements, so allowing retroactive application of Supreme Court decisions
recognizing a structural error will further the interests of due process with little
harm to the interests of the state in situations when the earlier error rendered the
underlying judicial proceeding worthy of little or no respect.

144

